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Prevent, free speech, ‘extremism’ and counter-terror 
interventions: exploring narratives about chilling expression in 
schools1  
  
Professor Helen Fenwick and Dr Daniel Fenwick 
 
Introduction 
     
The Prevent strategy – designed to avert the risk of persons being drawn into terrorism – 
creates polarisation of views to such an extent as to obscure its real impact on expression in 
schools, the focus of this article. Outside academia, the most high-profile and critical 
narratives claiming that Prevent chills expression appear to have arisen in the context of 
schools, as opposed to other educational sectors.2 While referrals in education linked to far-
right ‘radicalisation’ have recently risen steeply,3 such narratives are at present confined to 
the impact – or perceived impact – of Prevent on Muslims.  The claimed compilation of a 
‘secret’ database by police, storing details of persons subject to Prevent referrals, has also 
recently been criticised, not only as an invasion of privacy, but also as potentially placing 
inhibitions on speech.4 Opponents of Prevent, including Muslim civil society groups,5 have 
                                                          
1 Our thanks are due to the anonymous reviewer for their valuable feedback. 
2 See e.g.: Rights Watch (UK), “Preventing Education? Human Rights and UK Counter-Terrorism Policy in 
Schools” (July 2016), pp.4-5.  
3 Referrals for right wing ‘extremism’ accounted for 12% of referrals from the education sector in 2015/16, 
rising to 28% in 2018/19 (17% were Islamist-related, 44% related to unclear ideology); thus, such referrals 
increased by 70% between 2015-2019: Home Office, “Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent 
Programme” (December 2019), https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/individuals-referred-to-and-
supported-through-the-prevent-programme-statistics [Accessed 01.04.20], Appendix A at D.11. See also points 
made as to Prevent’s relevance to white supremacism, referencing the attack on a New Zealand mosque: HC 
Deb, 18 March 2019, Vol.656 col 793. 
4 See J. Grierson, “Counter-terror police running secret Prevent database”, 6.10.19, the Guardian 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/oct/06/counter-terror-police-are-running-secret-prevent-database 
[Accessed 01.04.20]. But such collection of data could breach the Data Protection Act 2018, if the referral was 
mistaken, and a right to notification and erasure would appear to arise (ss45, 39, 47 DPA 2018), provided the 
information was not deemed to require exemption from those rights for the purpose of safeguarding national 
security (s45(4)(d), s48(3)(d)).  
5 See MEND, “An Independent Review of Prevent: A Position Paper from Muslim Engagement and 
Development” (1 February 2019), https://mend.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/An-Independent-Review-of-
PREVENT-A-Position-Paper-from-Muslim-Engagement-and-Development.pdf [Accessed 01.04.20]; Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism, “Human rights impact of policies and practices aimed at preventing and countering violent 
extremism” (A/HRC/43/46, 21 February 2020).  
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drawn upon such criticisms to argue that Prevent normalises Islamophobia6 and as applied in 
schools is akin to a totalitarian measure intended to monitor Muslim pupils’ speech for 
ideological compliance with ‘British’ values.7 Proponents, in contrast, claim that the impact 
of Prevent on free speech in schools8 is greatly exaggerated by its critics, and dispute its 
characterisation  as a strategy targeting Muslim pupils generally,9 while it has also been 
suggested that some hyperbolic criticisms of Prevent are attributable to an anti-Prevent lobby 
that is itself associated with ‘extremism’.10  
 
It was clear from the inception of Prevent that the goals of countering ‘extremism’ and 
‘radicalisation’ by promoting ‘British’ values had the potential to conflict with the goal of 
achieving free debate about political, cultural or religious grievances linked to terrorism,11 
potentially chilling expression. In exploring that possibility below, the efforts of the domestic 
courts recently, and of the ECtHR to interpret and balance these goals constructively in a 
manner that is compatible with Article 10 ECHR,12 will be found to be relevant to the 
complex speech environment in schools, which is subject to a range of existing duties 
supporting critical thinking and plural debate on moral, religious and political issues. An 
independent review of Prevent pursuant to a 2019 statutory commitment13 is underway,14 
although it itself is currently mired in controversy,15 so the determinations embarked on 
                                                          
6 See: M. Versi, “Concerns on Prevent: Meeting between David Anderson QC and the MCB” (Muslim Council 
of Britain 2015) https://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/20150803-Case-studies-about-
Prevent.pdf [Accessed 01.04.20]; Rupa Huq MP, Public Bill Committee, “Counter-terrorism and Border 
Security Bill” (10 July 2018, Bill 219, 2017–2019) pp.136-139. 
7 CAGE Advocacy, “Beyond Prevent” (CAGE, 2020), www.cage.ngo/product/beyond-prevent-a-real-
alternative-to-securitised-policies, p.26; J. Mohammed and A. Siddiqui, “The PREVENT strategy: A cradle to 
grave police-state” (CAGE, 2013), www.cage.ngo/prevent-strategy-cradle-grave-police-state Concerns are not 
limited to Islamic activist groups: W. Armbrust ‘“Prevent”, free speech and anti-semitism’ (Opendemocracy, 15 
April 2017), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/prevent-free-speech-and-antisemitism/ [All accessed 01.04.20]. 
8 The term ‘schools’ will be used to refer to maintained primary and secondary schools (those controlled by 
Local Education Authorities), academies (defined in the Academies Act 2010 s1A, and funded by the DfE 
pursuant to an Academy agreement), and private independent schools. 
9 See: Ben Wallace, Public Bill Committee, ‘Counter-terrorism and Border Security Bill’ PBC (10 July 2018, 
Bill 219, 2017–2019) pp.144-146; S. Greer and L. Bell, “Counter-terrorist law in British universities: a review 
of the ‘prevent’ debate” [2018] P.L. 84. 
10 See e.g. R. Sutton, “Myths and Misunderstandings: Understanding Opposition to The Prevent Strategy” 
(Henry Jackson Society, September 2016) http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Myths-
and-Misunderstandings-PREVENT-Report-Final-29.09.2016.pdf [Accessed 01.04.20], p.2. 
11 DfE, “The Prevent duty: Departmental advice for schools and childcare providers” (‘DA’) (June 2015), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/439598/preve
nt-duty-departmental-advice-v6.pdf [Accessed 01.04.20], p.8.  
12 Applicable to state sector schools under ss6 and 2 Human Rights Act. 
13 In s20(8) Counter-terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. 
14 See Gov.uk, Independent Review of Prevent, 16.9.19, up-dated 20.12.19.  
15 Lord Carlile was required to stand down as the Independent reviewer due to a threatened judicial review 
challenge from Rights Watch on grounds of an alleged lack of independence: Rights Watch (UK), “Government 
removes Lord Carlile as Prevent reviewer conceding RWUKs legal challenge to his independence” 20.12.19, the 
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below as to tension or consonance between Prevent’s objective of countering terrorism, and 
free expression values are timely,16 and contribute to an academic literature largely focused 
on campuses.17 The key argument will be that, rather than abolition of Prevent, reforms to the 
Prevent Guidance, focussing on a re-envisaging of the term ‘extremism’, would create a 
greater likelihood of achieving such consonance than is the case under its current iteration, 
whilst also addressing the narrative as to Islamophobia. 
 
The nature and operation of the Prevent duty in the school context 
   
The Prevent strategy, originally introduced in 2006 as one of the four pillars of Contest,18 has 
been through a number of subsequent iterations,19 reflecting the increasing emphasis in 
domestic and international counter-terrorism efforts on early intervention.20 That emphasis 
formed the background to the Counter Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA), Part 5,21 which 
placed the Prevent duty (PD) on a statutory basis with accompanying Guidance.22 In 
focussing on countering ‘extremism’ in schools,23 apparently as part of the initial phase of 
‘radicalisation,’24 Prevent was intended to address concerns as to ‘radicalisation’ raised by 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Independent, https://www.rwuk.org/government-removes-lord-carlile-as-prevent-reviewer-conceding-rwuks-
legal-challenge-to-his-independence/ [Accessed 01.04.20].  
16 The Review’s report and recommendations were to be submitted by June 2020: Home Office, 
“Independent review of Prevent: terms of reference” (16.09.19) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-review-of-prevent-terms-of-
reference/independent-review-of-prevent-terms-of-reference [Accessed 01.04.20]; however, the 
Review has subsequently been severely delayed. At the time of writing (2.4.20) no replacement Reviewer (see 
fn.15) has been appointed, although the government is seeking at present to recruit one: James Brokenshire, HC 
Deb, 17 March 2020, WA - 27060.  
17 See: L. Zedner, “Counter-terrorism on campuses” (2018) 68 University of Toronto Law Journal 545; Greer 
and Bell, fn.9; I. Cram and H. Fenwick, “Protecting free speech and academic freedom in Universities” (2018) 
81(5) MLR 825. 
18 Home Office, Countering International Terrorism: The UK’s Strategy, Cm.6888, 2006; Home Office, 
Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, Cm.8123, 2011; Cm.9608, 2018. 
19 See for discussion: C. Walker, “Counter-terrorism and counter-extremism: the UK policy spirals” [2018] P.L. 
725. 
20 See: M. Lombardi et. al., Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism Among Youth to Prevent 
Terrorism (Amsterdam: IOS, 2014); C. Walker, “The War of Words with Terrorism: An Assessment of Three 
Approaches to Pursue and Prevent” (2017) 22(3) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 523, 544-50; UN Secretary 
General, “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism” (A/70/674, 24.12.15).  
21 See Home Office, Contest Annual Report, Cm.9048, 2014, para 2.34. 
22 Home Office, “The Revised Prevent Duty Guidance” (‘PDG’) (Home Office, “The Revised Prevent Duty 
Guidance” (10 April 2019), www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance [Accessed 01.04.20]. 
23 Home Office, Prevent Strategy, Cm.8092, 2011, p.19. 
24 Defined as the process by which a person comes to be drawn into terrorism, coming to supporting terrorism 
and/or ‘extremist’ ideologies associated with terrorist groups, reflecting the government definition: Home 
Office, Prevent Strategy, Cm.8092, 2011, Annex A.  
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the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair, or more generally,25 while recent convictions of pupils and teachers 
for terrorist offences provide it with an ongoing driver.26 That focus, however, has limits: the 
duty would have complemented proposed legislation specifically targeting ‘extremism’ as a 
harm regardless of any link to terrorism;27 while that proposal was ultimately shelved, the 
linkage envisaged in the accompanying Guidance itself lacks articulation. 
 
The duty under Part 5, s26 requires “specified authorities”,28 including schools,29 to have ‘due 
regard’ to “the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”30 when carrying out 
their functions, but the steps to be taken to do so are left unspecified. Those terms are 
obviously highly imprecise; the revised Prevent duty Guidance (PDG),31 promulgated by the 
Home Secretary under s29(1), fleshes out s26 by mentioning matters to which schools ‘must 
have regard’ to fulfil the duty,32 but itself suffers from lack of precision. The Departmental 
Advice (DA) provided by the Department of Education (DfE)33 is even more inexact; it also 
has the status only of advice, accompanied by no statutory duty to have regard to it.34  
 
Over-breadth of the ‘extremism’ terminology 
 
                                                          
25 See: H. Fenwick and D. Fenwick, ‘Prevent in Schools after the Trojan Horse Affair’ in I. Cram (ed.) 
Extremism, Free Speech and Counter Terrorism Law and Policy: International and Comparative Perspectives 
(London: Routledge, 2019); P. Clarke, “Report into allegations concerning Birmingham schools arising from the 
‘Trojan Horse’ letter” (HMSO, 2014). See also D. Woodward-Carlton, “Radicalisation and the Family Courts” 
(2019) 49 Family Law 752. See as to pupils who died fighting for Daesh: E. Carmi and A. Gianfrancesco, 
“Brighton & Hove Local Safeguarding children board serious case review: siblings W and X: Identifying the 
strengths and gaps in multi-agency responses to vulnerable adolescents at risk of exploitation through 
radicalisation” (27.7.17) http://www.brightonandhovelscb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Siblings-W-and-X-SCR-
July-2017.pdf [Accessed 01.04.20]. 
26 Examples include: Umar Haque (below, fn.94); a 17 year old pupil who planned an attack on Synagogues as 
part of a ‘race war’: L. Dearden, “Teenage neo-Nazi who planned terror attacks on synagogues as part of ‘race 
war’ jailed” the Independent, 7.1.20, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/synagogue-attack-durham-
neo-nazi-teenager-jailed-terror-antisemitism-a9273696.html [Accessed 01.04.20]. See also: “Operation of police 
powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation” (Statistical Bulletin: 08/19, 13.06.19), p.14: 
under-18s accounted for 6% of arrests, a similar level to the previous year, “the highest proportion of under-18s 
arrested since data collection began in 2001”. 
27 See: Home Office, Counter-Extremism Strategy, Cm.9148, 2015, paras 9-20, 37-41; in relation to schools: 
ibid, paras 70-4; for criticism see J. Rivers, “Counter-Extremism, Fundamental Values and the Betrayal of 
Liberal Democratic Constitutionalism” (2018) 12(2) German Law Review 267, pp.275-77. 
28 In England, Wales, Scotland: section 51(1) CTSA 2015. 
29 Sched 6 CTSA, part 1, ‘Education, Childcare etc,’ para 1.  
30 By section 35(3) the term ‘terrorism’ bears the same meaning as in s1 Terrorism Act 2000, a definition 
recognized to be extremely broad: R v Gul [2013] UKSC 64 [26]-[34].  
31 PDG, fn.22. 
32 Pursuant to The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Guidance) 
Regulations 2015 s3. Under s29(2) authorities ‘must have regard’ to this guidance.  
33 DA, fn.11, p.8. 
34 The DA is not covered by s29(2). Local authorities have also produced guidance for schools.  
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An initial step to which schools should have regard in seeking to satisfy s26 involves 
countering ‘extremism’, but the term as used in the Guidance is, at face value, problematic 
since it is stated to include “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values” without 
clarifying a link to ‘radicalisation’, and terrorism.35 These values are stated, impliedly 
contrasting with ‘extremism’, to include a commitment to democracy, the rule of law, 
individual liberty, ‘mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’.36 This PDG 
requirement is clearly directed at expression in schools opposed to such values which is also 
linked to inciting/supporting terrorism, comporting with the wording of s26. But the 
expression of non-violent ‘extremism’ is also covered, although such ‘extremism’ is not 
defined; reference is merely made to its possible results, such as creating social division and 
the encouraging of isolation.37 An even greater lack of clarity pervades the DA, while it also 
fails to differentiate between violent and non-violent ‘extremism’, in providing that schools 
should have regard to the need to assess signs in pupils of supporting ‘extremist ideas, part of 
terrorist ideology’, while also preventing the dissemination to pupils of online ‘extremist’ 
material.38 The PDG further refers to avoidance of ‘radicalisation’ to satisfy s26, without 
clarifying the link to exposure to ‘extremist’ expression; it also fails to define the term, 
merely indicating that it is a process by which individuals are brought to participate in 
terrorism, such as giving support to terrorist groups and to ‘extremist ideology’ linked to such 
groups.39 The DA compounds the uncertainty, mentioning building pupils’ “resilience to 
radicalisation…by promoting fundamental ‘British’ values and enabling them to challenge 
extremist views”.40   
 
Unsurprisingly, use of the terms ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ has been criticized as a 
failing of Prevent and counter-extremism policy generally, most notably by the Commission 
for Countering Extremism;41 the Butt case, discussed below, could, however, lead in effect to 
some narrowing of the scope of the Prevent duty, re-emphasising the need for a link between 
                                                          
35 See PDG, fn.22, para 7. For criticism of the linkage between ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ see: Cram and 
Fenwick, fn.17, 835; J. Holmwood and T. O’Toole, Countering Extremism in British Schools? (2018 Policy 
Press) pp.54-57.  
36 PDG, fn.22, para 7.  
37 PDG, fn.22, para 10. 
38 DA, fn.11, pp.5-6, 8.  
39 Ibid, part F, ‘Glossary of Terms’; Home Office, Prevent Strategy, Cm.8092, 2011, Annex A.  
40 Ibid, p.8. See also DfE, “Promoting fundamental British values as part of SMSC in schools” (November 
2014), pp.5-7. For discussion, see M.Sedgwick “The Concept of Radicalisation as a Source of Confusion” 
(2010) 22 Terrorism and Political Violence 479. 
41 “Challenging Hateful Extremism” (October 2019), p.94; see also Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
Freedom of Speech in Universities, (2017-19, HL 589, HC 111), para 66.  
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curbing ‘extremist’ expression and countering terrorist-related activity. Nevertheless, 
uncertainty is currently generated by the use of these terms, which is also exacerbated in the 
schools’ context since the impact of the Prevent duty on expression must be situated in the 
complex context of the safeguarding and other overlapping duties imposed on schools; 
account must also be taken of the extent to which the PD has influenced them. As the PDG 
and DA indicate, complementary duties to counter ‘extremism’ or promote plural debate42 are 
found in a number of other education-related statutory duties;43 inter alia, schools must not 
engage in the promotion of “partisan political views”,44 or “political indoctrination”45 and 
have a duty to ensure a balanced treatment of political issues.46 The DA further links 
“resilience to radicalisation” to the legal duty of schools to promote the “spiritual, moral, 
social and cultural development” of pupils,47 while the PDG refers to the overlap between the 
PD and schools’ legal duties to further “community cohesion” and to promote equality.48 
Some linkage to the statutory duty of state sector schools to adhere to Article 10 ECHR also 
arises since the PDG and DA emphasise the need to ensure free discussion of ‘sensitive 
topics’ in adhering to Prevent.49  
 
But this web of overlapping and arguably conflicting duties – ‘discussing sensitive topics’ 
may not, apparently, include criticism of ‘British’ values – does not deliver a scheme clearly 
and effectively linked to intervention in pathways to engagement in terrorist-related activity. 
Equally, it does not provide a clear guide to balancing such intervention with enabling 
pluralistic debate in schools. It appears, in essence, to place two key over-lapping demands 
on schools, as discussed in the next two sections – first, to identify and refer to police pupils 
showing allegiance to ‘extremism’, and second to disallow ‘extremist’ speech in schools, 
whether from external speakers or otherwise. But even these demands under the current 
iteration of Prevent lack a precisely articulated linkage to the objective of s26. 
 
                                                          
42 PDG, fn.22, para 58; DA, fn.11, p.8. 
43 See: Independent School Standards Regulations 2014 Sched 1 para 5(2), DfE, “Promoting fundamental 
British values as part of SMSC in schools” (November 2014). 
44 Ibid. para 5(c) (private independent schools and academies). 
45 Education Act 1996 s406 (maintained schools). 
46 Ibid, para 5(d) (private independent schools and academies), and Education Act 1996 s407 (maintained 
schools). 
47 DA, fn.11, p.8. See further Education Act 2002 s78 (maintained schools), s157 (private independent schools 
and academies). 
48 PDG, fn.22, para 12; see also: Education and Inspections Act 2006 s38 (maintained schools); Independent 
School Standards Regulations 2014, Sched 1 para 5(b)(v) re ‘cohesion’; Equality Act 2010 s149.  
49 DA, fn.11, p.8; PDG, fn.22, para 64. 
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Referrals for pupil ‘extremism’ - inhibiting speech by creating suspect groups?  
 
The PDG, backed up largely by DfE or Ofsted-based sanctions,50 and the threat of funding 
withdrawal,51 requires that schools can demonstrate via staff training52 as a core outcome that 
they are able to assess risks of ‘radicalisation’ and identify at-risk pupils, by, as one example, 
noting support for ‘extremist’ ideas.53 The DA and PDG, however, fail to define clearly the 
signs of potential ‘radicalisation’ that schools should be looking for, which could lead to a 
referral of a pupil to a Channel Police Practitioner (CPP).54 Unhelpfully, they need to be read 
alongside DfE Safe-guarding documentation55 which itself refers to Channel guidance, 
identifying signs of ‘radicalisation’ as ‘vulnerability factors’, including pupil expression of 
‘extreme’ political/religious views or of a range of ‘grievances’,56 covering, for example, 
current and historical racial/cultural discrimination.57 Police guidance and influence on 
school referrals similarly lacks rigour,58 contributing to mistrust of Prevent in certain Muslim 
communities, some of whom consider it to create an “ideological purity test meaning Western 
                                                          
50 The institution could fail an Ofsted inspection: Ofsted, “School inspection handbook” (Ref: 150066, 2018), 
p.42. Periodic inspections are required and authorized under s5 Education Act 2005; PDG, fn.22, para 72; see 
e.g.: Ofsted, “Inspection report: Lantern of Knowledge Secondary School, 15–17 January 2019” (2019), 
https://files.api.ofsted.gov.uk/v1/file/50060206; “Inspection Report for Olive Tree Primary School”, 13-15 May 
2014” (2014) (literature appeared to endorse stoning and violent jihad), 
https://files.api.ofsted.gov.uk/v1/file/2391277; M. Smulian, “Islamic school rated ‘inadequate’ over offensive 
library books”, Times Educational Supplement, 08.03.19, https://www.tes.com/news/islamic-school-rated-
inadequate-over-offensive-library-books. Special measures could be imposed: Education Act 2005, s44 and the 
Education and Inspections Act 2006 Part 4. Ofsted inspections of non-state schools are authorised under s110 of 
the Education and Skills Act 2008. See Ofsted, “Non-association independent school inspection handbook” 
(Ref: 160050, September 2018). See also the Independent Schools Inspectorate, “Inspection Framework” 
(2017), https://www.isi.net/site/downloads/1.1%20Handbook%20Inspection%20Framework%202018-09.pdf 
[All accessed 01.04.20]. Private schools could be withdrawn from the relevant register: Education Act 2002, 
s165. 
51 Academies Act 2010, ss2A and 2D.   
52 PDG, fn.22, para 70; DA, fn.11, pp.5-6. The cornerstone of such training is the “Workshops to Raise 
Awareness of Prevent” scheme, reflecting Home Office and police advice on ‘radicalisation’, focusing on an 
individual’s ‘vulnerability’ to being drawn into terrorism: Home Office, “Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting 
vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism” (2015), paras 92-98. 
53 Ibid, paras 67,68. See also DA, fn.11, p.6: schools can consult Local Safeguarding Children Boards and 
Prevent co-ordinators (in Prevent Priority areas), supplementing duties of schools, LEAs to safeguard children 
under s17 Children Act 1989 and s11 Children Act 2004 (s28 Wales). 
54 Home Office, Channel Duty Guidance, fn.52, para 31. 
55 DfE, “Keeping children safe in education: Statutory guidance for schools and colleges” (2019) p.86; see also 
PDG, fn.22, para 62. 
56 See: Home Office, “Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill - Support for people vulnerable to being drawn into 
terrorism” (HO0143, 25 November 2014), highlighting the lack of a clear connection between terrorism and the 
broad Channel vulnerability criteria. See also fn.52. 
57 See M. Sukarieh, and S. Tannock “The deradicalisation of education: terror, youth and the assault on 
learning” (2016) 57(4) Race & Class 22,29. 
58 See: P. Dresser, “‘Trust your instincts– act!’ PREVENT police officers’ perspectives of counter-radicalisation 
reporting thresholds” (2019) 12(4) Critical Studies on Counter-terrorism 605, pp.614-15; Association of Chief 




foreign policy cannot be criticised,”59  and facilitating claims made by critics of Prevent that 
the prospect of referral of a pupil to the police is having a profound, widespread chilling 
effect on the expression of Muslim pupils,60 implying at times that the majority of such pupils 
are at risk of referral.  
The reality is somewhat different. Contrary to the perception of some critics of Prevent,61 the 
Channel Duty Guidance does not direct that referrals should be made purely on the basis of 
identifying one or more of the ‘vulnerability’ factors, but rather – in common with 
safeguarding good practice – requires that account should be taken of various factors, 
including, for example, mental health.62 The credibility of a concern must be checked, 
referring only where the attention of a specialist is genuinely required.63 A referral may also 
be discontinued at the CPP stage unless a “vulnerability [of a pupil] to being drawn into 
terrorism”64 is identified, in which case he or she may be referred to the local Channel Panel 
which will initially conduct a “Screening and Information-Gathering Stage”, without the 
consent of the pupil/parents, if deemed necessary,65 thereby determining whether to 
discontinue the referral or set up an intervention.66   
 
Despite the numerous filtering mechanisms tending to insulate pupils from mistaken referrals, 
and governmental insistence that political, cultural or religious grievances are not the primary 
focus of Channel/Prevent,67 Prevent interventions contributed to a number of complaints 
shortly after the duty was introduced, from Muslim pupils and parents against schools68 
and/or local authorities,69 although some complaints were revealed to be incorrect or over-
                                                          
59 See Brighton & Hove Local Safeguarding children board, fn.25, para 6.1.18. 
60 See Rights Watch, fn.2, p.4. 
61 See e.g. Mohammed and Siddiqui, fn.7, para 3.8.  
62 Home Office, Channel Duty Guidance, fn.52, para 49. 
63 PDG, fn.22, para 21. 
64 CTSA s36(3) as amended by s20 Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019; see further Home Office, 
Channel Duty Guidance, fn.52, para 30. 
65 This stage appears to have fuelled concerns raised in the media as to a ‘secret data-base’: fn.4.  
66 Home Office, CONTEST 2018, fn.18, fig 2.5. CTSA s36(4). The panel can create a support plan involving 
family or social welfare services, or direct the individual to a diversionary programme: CTSA s36(1)(3). Home 
Office, fn.52, para 39. 
67 See Home Office, CONTEST 2018, fn.18, pp.35-38. 
68 See: Rights Watch, fn.2, chap 4; Public Bill Committee, ‘Counter-terrorism and Border Security Bill’ PBC 
(10 July 2018, Bill 219, 2017–2019) pp. 136-139 per Rupa Huq MP; J. Halliday and V. Dodd, “UK Anti-
Radicalisation Prevent Strategy a ‘Toxic Brand,’” the Guardian, 09.03.15, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/mar/09/anti-radicalisation-prevent-strategy-a-toxic-brand [Accessed 01.04.20].  
69 See A. Straw, “Investigatory Powers Bill, the Prevent duty, state secrecy and fundamental rights” (Public Law 
Project, 08.12.16) https://publiclawproject.org.uk/resources/investigatory-powers-bill-the-prevent-duty-state-
secrecy-and-fundamental-rights/ [Accessed 01.04.20], para 45. 
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stated.70 It has also been contended that the prospect of referral, could ‘securitise’ education71 
and discourage pupils from expressing certain views in the classroom.72 
 
The claim therefore in much of the literature that the breadth and subjectivity of the 
vulnerability criteria could result in disproportionate inferences with free expression in 
schools, especially of Muslim pupils, has some substance.73 While the contention that such 
interferences could have contributed to a perception that Contest/Prevent treat Muslims as a 
‘suspect community’74 has at times lacked substantiation,75 it could in itself potentially 
undermine the wider goal of Prevent to build trust with Muslim communities so that they are 
more likely to assist in addressing the threat of terrorism and ‘radicalisation’.76  
 
But that anti-Prevent stance may now be due for some revision: while the referral scheme can 
readily be criticised for imprecision, it contains a number of checks before a police officer is 
involved, and any support eventually recommended must be consented to.77 In response to 
widespread concerns about teachers’ lack of understanding of Prevent,78 the government 
recently provided additional support for Prevent training,79 which may have contributed to a 
diminution in the number of clearly mistaken referrals to the CPP from 2016 onwards, even 
                                                          
70 One widely reported example concerned a pupil visited by police after writing that he lived ‘in a terrorist 
house’, apparently as a misspelling for ‘terraced’ (in his evidence to the JCHR David Anderson highlighted this 
referral as a ‘myth’ since the police disputed the parents’ assertion that the investigation was primarily about 
‘radicalisation’ rather than concern for the wellbeing of the child, since he had also written that his uncle was 
abusing him (JCHR, Counter Extremism (2016-17, HL 39 HC 105), para 49). Certain reports concerned a child 
apparently referred under Prevent to Luton Council safeguarding hub - it was in fact a domestic abuse referral - 
for a drawing a teacher mistakenly thought was a ‘cooker bomb’, revealed to be a cucumber (ibid). See re 
Prevent ‘myths’ L. Casey, “The Casey Review: A review into opportunity and integration” (Department of 
Communities and Local Government, 2016), para 10.32. 
71 Commission for Countering Extremism, fn.41, p.86. 
72 See e.g.: O’Toole et. al., ‘Governing through Prevent? Regulation and Contested Practice in State–Muslim 
Engagement’ (2015) 50(1) Sociology 160. 
73 See: S. Hooper, “‘End Prevent’: UK government faces new calls to drop counter-terrorism strategy”, Middle-
East Eye, 17.01.20, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/end-prevent-uk-government-faces-new-calls-drop-
counter-terrorism-strategy [Accessed 01.04.2020]; Rights Watch, fn.2, paras 29-33.  
74 See: Open Society Justice Initiative, “Eroding Trust: The UK’s PREVENT Counter-Extremism Strategy in 
Health and Education” (Open Society Foundations, 2016), pp. 23, 107-109; M. Breen-Smyth, “Theorising the 
‘suspect community’: counterterrorism, security practices and the public imagination” (2014) 7(2) Critical 
Studies on Terrorism, 468; C. Pantazis and S. Pemberton “From the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ suspect community” 
(2009) 49(5) British Journal of Criminology 646; Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, “Addressing 
Islamic Extremism” (Number 526, May 2016), p.4. 
75 See for criticism: S. Greer, “The myth of the ‘securitised Muslim community’” in C.Walker and G.Lennon 
(eds.) Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2017). 
76 Open Society Justice Initiative, fn.74, p.108. 
77 CTSA s 36(4)(b). 
78 See: Rights Watch, fn.2, p.9; C. Walker, “Interdiction and Indoctrination: The Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act 2015” (2016) 79(5) MLR 840, 857.  
79 See Home Office, CONTEST The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, Cm.9608, 2018, 
paras 114, 118. 
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though the number of referrals to Channel has risen.80 A number of mistaken Prevent 
interventions, including those high profile ones referred to in this article,81 failed to pass one 
stage of the filtering mechanisms; a higher number are currently passing it, including the CPP 
filter, and proceeding to the Channel panel;82 one explanation is that they are referrals with 
greater credibility, including higher numbers of referrals linked to far-right ideology. 
Research, including a significant recent academic study, suggests that the understanding of 
vulnerability to ‘extremist’ influence and ‘radicalisation’, as a safeguarding matter under 
Prevent, has improved,83 as has teachers’ understanding of their responsibilities under the 
PD,84 although the quality of Prevent training continues to attract some criticism.85 While 
criticisms that the breadth of the Channel criteria for ‘radicalisation’-based referrals could 
lead to referrals on the basis of ignorance of or antipathy to certain political viewpoints or 
religious convictions are not entirely unfounded, the indications from more recent studies are 
that Prevent training may be having a positive impact in terms of discouraging inappropriate 
referrals.86 The possibility remains, nonetheless, that narratives associating Prevent’s impact 
in schools with Islamophobia87 could create a chilling effect out of proportion to the security 
                                                          
80 “In the year ending March 2019, Prevent referrals were the lowest recorded since comparable data is available 
(year ending March 2016); however, the number of those discussed at a Channel panel (1,320) and adopted as a 
case (561) were the highest recorded” Home Office 2019 Report, fn.3, p.8.  
81 See fn.70, fn.137 and associated text.  
82 See Home Office 2019 Report, fn.3, p.12. 
83 J. Busher,  T. Choudhury, P. Thomas and G. Harris, “What the Prevent duty means for schools and colleges in 
England: An analysis of educationalists’ experiences” (Centre for Peace, Trust and Social Relations, Coventry 
University and Aziz Foundation, 2017), http://azizfoundation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/What-the-
Prevent-Duty-means-for-schools-and-colleges-in-England.pdf [Accessed 01.04.20]; it found little evidence that 
educational professionals perceive the duty to have led to a chilling effect on free speech in schools (p.53), and 
found “considerable support (41% of respondents) for the view that...Prevent had resulted in more open 
discussions...as to...extremism, intolerance and inequality” (p.51). See also: Commission for Countering 
Extremism, fn.41, p.87. 
84 See: Government Social Research, “The school snapshot survey: winter 2017” (July 2018), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/727807/The_s
chool_snapshot_survey_winter_2017.pdf [Accessed 01.04.20], p.33. 
85 See e.g.: A. Moffat and F. Gerard, “Securitising education: an exploration of teachers’ attitudes and 
experiences regarding the implementation of the Prevent duty in sixth form colleges” Critical Studies on 
Terrorism, DOI: 10.1080/17539153.2019.1629860, p.8; Public Bill Committee, ‘Counter-terrorism and Border 
Security Bill’ PBC (10 July 2018, Bill 219, 2017–2019) pp.136-139 per Rupa Huq MP; “MEND responds to the 
announcement by the Government of an Independent review into PREVENT” (24 January 2019), 
https://www.mend.org.uk/news/mend-responds-announcement-government-independent-review-prevent/ 
[Accessed 01.04.20]; T. Chisholm and A. Coulter, “Safeguarding and radicalisation” (Kantar Public, Social 
Science in Government, August 2017) pp.21-22. 
86 See fn.83. 
87 See e.g. L. Jerome, A. Elwick and R. Kazima, “The impact of the Prevent duty on schools: A review of the 
evidence” (2019) 45(4) British Educational Research Journal 821, pp.824-27; C. McGlynn and S. McDaid 
“Radicalisation and Higher Education: Students’ Understanding and Experiences, Terrorism and Political 
Violence” (2019) 31(3) 559, pp.567-68. 
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benefit of the measures,88 a significant issue for the current independent Review, which 
should therefore address itself to clarification of the signs of allegiance to ‘extremism’ 
associated with ‘radicalisation’ in the Guidance and to clarification of the terms, deflecting 
criticism by aligning them more clearly with the stated objective of s26.  
 
Speakers in schools: avoiding ‘extremist’ expression  
    
Ambiguity also imbues the Prevent stance as to the link between ‘extremist’ speech and 
acceptance of ‘British’ values in schools. The governmental stance is that Prevent creates a 
safeguarding scheme that does not itself require the promotion of ‘British’ values,89 but if a 
school tolerates “vocal opposition” to such values (‘extremism’),90 the PDG indicates that so 
doing could facilitate a risk of ‘radicalisation’, contrary to the duty. It refers specifically to 
the need for “clear protocols” on visiting external speakers to ensure that they are 
“appropriately supervised”, implicitly in order to ensure that ‘extremist’ views are not 
expressed which might create that risk.91 Similarly, statutory safeguarding guidance, referred 
to in the DA, sets out a duty to take seriously allegations of staff ‘extremism’ and to have 
robust recruitment policies to avoid the appointment of ‘extremists’.92 Where a teacher 
contributes to a risk of ‘radicalisation’ by, for example, expressing ‘extremist’ views or 
inviting an ‘extremist’ speaker to the school, he or she could be subject to disciplinary 
procedures, dismissed, or in more serious cases subjected to a prohibition order, barring him 
or her from teaching.93 The use of the term ‘extremism’ remains open to criticism, but that 
should not obscure genuine safeguarding concerns: a stark example of the need to investigate 
the background and activities of staff to protect pupils against ‘radicalisation’ was provided 
by a London school that had employed an unqualified Islamic Studies teacher, who was then 
                                                          
88 Due to the involvement of the police; Giniewski v France (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 23 provides a partial analogy (a 
criminal prosecution was merely mentioned, but it was found to create a chilling effect). 
89 See: Select Committee on Citizenship and Civic Engagement, “Oral Evidence” (Evidence Session 1, 6 
September 2017), https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/Citizenship-civic-engagement/Oral-
Evidence-Volume.pdf [Accessed 01.04.20], p.20, per Hardip Begol. 
90 PDG, fn.22, para 7. 
91 PDG, fn.22, para 68.  
92 DA, fn.11, p.6; DfE, fn.55, pp.85-6; see also on safeguarding duties generally: DfE, ibid, parts 2 and 4; s175 
Education Act 2002. 
93 See The Teachers' Disciplinary (England) Regulations 2012 SI 2012/560 regs 4,5(1),7(5),13; DfE ‘Teacher 
misconduct….Advice on factors relating to decisions leading to the prohibition of teachers from the teaching 
profession’ (April 2018): 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/700607/Teach
er_misconduct-the_prohibition_of_teachers.pdf, p.13; DfE, ‘Teachers’ Standards’ (June 2011) 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/665520/Teach
ers__Standards.pdf [Both Accessed 01.04.20], p.14. 
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convicted of various terrorist offences after grooming pupils to create a ‘jihadi’ army.94 No 
Prevent intervention had occurred. 
 
The central problem for schools seeking to follow the current iteration of the PDG in 
ensuring that their staff or speakers do not “vocally oppose” fundamental ‘British’ values as 
an aspect of countering ‘extremism’ is that there is no single authoritative and clear statement 
explaining why “democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect” are put 
forward as distinctively British values, and recent studies confirm that educationalists have 
not tended to adopt a common understanding of such values.95 That lack of a clear rationale 
has resulted in two of the most prevalent criticisms of Prevent: firstly, that values must be 
identifiable as ‘British’ to be worthy of protection96 and, secondly, that it is unclear what is 
meant by fundamental ‘British’ values and ‘extremism’.97 Such criticisms are key to 
objections to the Prevent duty raised by schools98 and teaching unions;99 they have also 
fostered claims from certain Muslim civil society groups to the effect that Prevent is in reality 
a totalitarian measure intended to challenge Islamic cultural values, or “de-Islamise Islam”.100 
In associating teaching ‘British’ values with counter-terror efforts the PDG might appear to 
indicate that expression of cultural, political and religious values differing from those held by 
                                                          
94 See J. Grierson, “Isis follower tried to create jihadist child army in east London”, the Guardian, 02.03.18, 
www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/02/isis-follower-umar-haque-jihadist-child-army-east-london--
radicalise: “Haque attempted to radicalise....110 children at [a] mosque and school...35 of them [needed]...long-
term support”. 
95 See: L. Jerome et. al., fn.87, pp.827-29; Busher et. al., fn.83, p.65. See also J. Busher, T. Choudhury, P. 
Thomas, “The enactment of the counter-terrorism ‘Prevent duty’ in British schools and colleges: beyond 
reluctant accommodation or straightforward policy acceptance” (2019) 12(3) Critical Studies on Terrorism 440, 
p.447; A. Elwick and L. Jerome “Balancing securitisation and education in schools: teachers’ agency in 
implementing the Prevent duty” (2019) 40(3) Journal of Beliefs & Values 338, p.350.  
96 See e.g.: Rights Watch, fn.2, p.4. 
97 See: C. Walker and O. Cawley, “The Juridification of the UK’s Counter-Terrorism Prevent Policy” (2020) 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2020.1727098, pp.9-10; Commission for Countering 
Extremism, fn.41, p.94; U. Maylor “I’d worry about how to teach it’: British values in English classrooms” 
(2016) 42(3) Journal of Education for Teaching 314, 322-325; D. Lowe, “Prevent Strategies: The Problems 
Associated in Defining Extremism: The Case of the UK” (2017) 40(11) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 917, 
921.   
98 See e.g.: P. Nye, “Inspections reveal Ofsted’s approach to British values in wake of ‘Trojan Horse’”, Schools 
Week, 27 November 2014, https://schoolsweek.co.uk/inspections-reveal-ofsteds-approach-to-british-values-in-
wake-of-trojan-horse/ [Accessed 01.04.20]; U. Siddique, “Losing faith in Ofsted” (Claystone, 2018), p.18. 
99 See K. Hollinshead and S. Soyei, “Responding holistically to the requirement to promote Fundamental British 
Values” (National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers, EqualiTeach CIC, 2015), 
https://www.nasuwt.org.uk/uploads/assets/uploaded/b49175fd-4bf6-4f2d-ac5b2759c03015be.pdf [Accessed 
01.04.20], p.7. 
100 R. Shabi, “Deradicalising Britain: the activists turning young Muslims away from extremism”, the Guardian, 
13.3.16, www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/18/deradicalising-britain-the-activists-turning-young-
muslims-away-from-extremism [Accessed 01.04.20]. 
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the majority in Britain could be met with a state-mandated adverse response,101 countering 
Prevent’s ostensible goal of allowing the “discuss[ion of] sensitive topics”.102 So leeway has 
been created for opponents of Prevent to argue that the policy prevents such debate, since on 
their view it is unclear when opposition to ‘British’ values will be considered to amount to 
‘extremism’103 and, relatedly, that the policy excludes participants deemed to have values that 
are ‘non-British’, particularly Muslims.104 Prevent’s promotion of ‘British’ values is, in the 
view of its detractors, self-contradictory, since they find that the strategy opposes such 
values, particularly of tolerance and freedom of speech.105   
 
These concerns should not, however, be overstated. The PDG makes it clear that neither staff 
nor students are required to adopt a state-sponsored ideology,106 as occurs in nationalistic 
schooling, associated with indoctrination.107 The DA calls for schools to counter ‘extremism’ 
by encouraging pluralistic debate, so schools should provide “a safe environment for debating 
controversial issues”…enabling staff and pupils to “develop the knowledge and skills 
to....challenge extremist arguments”.108 The prevalent characterisation of Prevent as a 
measure that is necessarily intolerant does not comport fully with the most recent research 
indicating that educationalists are not struggling to reconcile countering ‘extremism’ with the 
PDG’s promotion of discussion of ‘sensitive topics’ or with the statutory obligations 
discussed to promote free speech, equality and social cohesion.109  
 
Most significantly, avoidance of non-violent ‘extremist’ speech in schools should now be 
subject to reinterpretation of the PDG, following the Butt case.110 The applicant, an Islamic 
scholar who had spoken at university Islamic society events, complained that as a result of 
                                                          
101 Select Committee on Citizenship and Civic Engagement, “The Ties that Bind” (2017-18, HL 118), paras 62-
70. 
102 PDG, fn.22, para 64. 
103 See: Rights Watch, fn.2, pp.35-40; A. Kundnani, A decade lost: Rethinking Radicalisation (London: 
Claystone 2015). 
104 See: S. Warsi, The Enemy Within (London: Penguin, 2017), pp.109-111; Siddique, fn.98. 
105 See: Rights Watch, fn.2, p.4; A. Neal, “University free speech as a space of exception in Prevent” in I. Cram 
(ed.) Extremism, free speech and counter-terrorism law and policy (London: Routledge, 2019), chap 5. 
106 PDG, fn.22, para 64. 
107 See e.g.: Y.W. Leung, ‘Nationalistic Education and Indoctrination’ (2004) 6(2) Citizenship, Social and 
Economics Education 116. 
108 DA, fn.11, pp.5-6.  
109 See: D. McGhee and S. Zhang, ‘Nurturing resilient future citizens through value consistency vs the retreat 
from multiculturalism and securitisation in the promotion of British values in schools in the UK’ (2017) 21(8) 
Citizenship Studies 938, 945-47; Ofsted, fn.50, p.47: school leadership must ensure that: “…training develops 
staff’s vigilance, confidence and competency to challenge pupils’ views and encourage debate”.. . 




the Prevent duty, and due to being named as an ‘extremist’ by a Home Office press release,111 
invitations to speak would be less likely to be forthcoming. His challenge to the lawfulness of 
the Higher Education Prevent Duty Guidance (HEPDG)112 succeeded in part, on appeal,113 on 
narrow grounds specific to a defect in one paragraph: in promulgating the Guidance it was 
found that the Secretary of State had acted unlawfully since the requirement to have 
“particular regard to the duty to ensure freedom of speech” under s31(3)(a) CTSA had not 
been satisfied.114 But his claim that the Guidance equated “non-violent extremism with 
terrorism”, and that therefore issuing it was ultra vires the Secretary of State’s power under 
s29 to fulfil the s26 duty, was rejected: “If there is some non-violent extremism, however 
intrinsically undesirable, which does not create a risk that others will be drawn into terrorism, 
the guidance does not apply to it”.115 The inclusion of non-violent ‘extremism’ was not 
therefore found to go beyond what the Prevent duty lawfully permits, if in the circumstances 
it could be linked to the risk of drawing persons into terrorism. This important clarification of 
the relationship between the HEPDG and s26 would apply equally – or more strongly – to the 
PDG as it applies to schools, given the greater vulnerability of school children to persuasion 
from authority figures, as compared to students. It follows from that finding that the guidance 
to schools in the PDG and DA to curb the expression of views contrary to fundamental 
‘British values’, taking the form of non-violent ‘extremism’, should be disapplied, unless a 
potential link to drawing persons into terrorism is shown. Clearly, that clarification of the 
reach of the Prevent duty as delineated by the PDG, re-emphasising the link to terrorism, has 
a strong claim to be considered in the current Review, and then expressly recognised in 
revised Guidance.116  
 
                                                          
111 The press release concerned the use of the Prevent duty to prevent “‘extremists radicalising students 
on….campuses [and referred to 70 such events]….Dr Butt was among six speakers ‘named as expressing views 
contrary to British values’ on campus”: ibid [1].  
112 Butt v Secretary of State for the Home Dept [2017] EWHC 1930 (HC) [41]-[49].  
113 R (Butt) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 256 (CA). 
114 HEPDG, para 11 stated that a University must be “entirely convinced” that the risk of an external speaker 
drawing individuals into terrorism must be “fully mitigated”, or the event should not proceed; that requirement 
was found to be too unbalanced, so it was likely to mislead a university as to its duty to balance the PD with its 
s31(2)(a) duty (ibid [176]).  
115 Butt v SSHD [2017] EWHC 1930 at [30]; R (Butt) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 256 [155] (confirming the first 
instance finding).  
116 In response to Butt the Home Office issued an interim instruction to relevant institutions to consult the 
judgment transcript as to the offending paragraph: Home Office, “Prevent duty guidance for Scotland and 






But despite attempts in the current iteration of the Guidance to lend support to free debate and 
expression of a plurality of views in schools, there is substance to the criticism that the term 
‘British’ values is unclear, contributing to the narrative claiming that Prevent is opposed to 
the free expression of non-British cultural values, and also leaves links between ‘extremist’ 
speech, ‘radicalisation’ and terrorism largely unarticulated. On that note, this article turns to a 
more intensive scrutiny of that perception, or its actuality, in the context of the Article 10 
ECHR guarantee of free expression.117  
 
Conflicts between free expression values and Prevent’s curbs on ‘extremist’ 
speech? 
 
Freedom of expression is clearly of acute significance in educational settings, but no specific 
duty arises to promote freedom of speech in schools similar to that imposed on universities 
under s31 CTSA and the Education Act (no 2) 1986, s43.118 That freedom finds statutory 
protection under Article 10 ECHR due to s6 HRA; Article 10 is therefore binding upon 
maintained and academy schools, Ofsted, central and local authorities that produce Prevent 
guidance. It is not, however, binding on private schools, although they are covered by s26;119 
that is clearly a matter of concern since the aim of some private faith schools, in particular, 
unregistered and illegal ones, appears to be to segregate pupils from a pluralistic society of 
differing faiths and none, confining them within a faith-based, rather than a human rights-
based, zone, resulting in their subjection to a narrow curriculum, with subsequent damage to 
their educational experiences and life choices post-school.120 Such schools, if registered, are, 
however, subject to the educational standards framework discussed above, intended to ensure 
plurality of political debate,121 as well as to the PDG/DA requirements as to ‘free debate’ and 
adherence to democracy, liberty and tolerance, although such requirements are not reinforced 
by a legal duty to adhere to the ECHR.  
 
                                                          
117 At the time of writing there has been no Prevent-related successful challenge to Ofsted by a school under the 
HRA; see for an example of an unsuccessful challenge HM Chief Inspector of Education, Children's Services 
and Skills v The Interim Executive Board of Al-Hijrah School [2016] EWHC 2813. 
118 It creates a duty to take such “steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that freedom of speech within the 
law is secured for…visiting speakers”.  
119 See fn.29. 
120 See: Ofsted, “Annual Report 2016/17” (2017, HC 618) pp.18, 44-45; The Casey Review, fn.70, paras 7.48-
7.59; Commission for Countering Extremism, fn.41, p.89. 
121 See text to fn.42-fn.47.  
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But interferences via Prevent with state school-based speech may be justifiable under Article 
10(2) where links to terrorism, violence or hate speech are apparent. Claims might fail at the 
outset under a narrow interpretation of the term ‘victim’ under s7 HRA: the applicant’s claim 
in Butt that the HEPDG was unlawful since it had contributed to creating a chilling effect, 
indirectly preventing him from exercising his Article 10 right,122 was rejected on the basis 
that he could not claim to be a ‘victim’ since he had not advanced any evidence that 
University societies had failed to invite him to speak or rescinded invitations, or that they 
would be likely to do so.123 In the schools’ context, then, a claim that the PDG had resulted in 
interference with a speaker’s Article 10 right indirectly would probably fail; specific evidence 
that discouragement of expression had occurred, or was likely to occur,124 would appear to be 
required.125 In that case, if ‘extremist’ expression opposing fundamental ‘British’ values126 as 
defined in the PDG was at issue, it would tend to fall within the scope of Article 10(1) unless 
Article 17 applied since, as is well established, the term ‘expression’ covers all sorts of 
expression, including disturbing, or even discriminatory material;127 it was accepted 
impliedly that the ‘extremist’ speech at issue in Butt would have been covered by Article 
10(1).128  
 
But Article 17, providing that there is no “right to engage in any activity....aimed at the 
destruction of any of the [ECHR] rights and freedoms”, could play a role in precluding a 
finding that an interference fell within Article 10(1)129 due to measures adopted under the 
                                                          
122 Butt v SSHD [2017] EWHC 1930 [72]. 
123 Ibid [95]. Justice Ousley referred to the Strasbourg Court’s “Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria”: “to 
claim to be a [potential] victim…an applicant must produce reasonable and convincing evidence of the 
likelihood that a violation affecting him or her personally will occur; mere suspicion or conjecture is 
insufficient…However...a  law [could violate] rights,   in   the   absence   of   an   individual measure  of  
implementation,  if  he  or  she  is  required  either  to modify  his  or  her  conduct  or  risks  being  prosecuted,  
or  if  he  or she  is  a  member  of a  class  of people  who  risk  being directly affected  by the legislation” (ibid 
[82]). 
124 Ibid [92], citing Altuğ Taner Akçam v Turkey (2016) 62 E.H.R.R. 12, para 68. 
125 An example in which that test could have been satisfied concerned an apparent Prevent intervention 
attributable in part to teachers’ mistaken belief that a pupil’s t-shirt endorsed the leader of Daesh; the 
intervention was discontinued before the CPP stage was reached: Rights Watch, fn.2, p.32. 
126 PDG, fn.22, para 7. 
127 See Ibragim Iragimov and ors v Russia (App nos. 1413/08 and 28621/11), judgment of 28 August 2018; that 
material was contextualised by the theme of tolerance in the text in question. See further eg: Handyside v UK 
(1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 737; VBK v Austria (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 5; IA v Turkey (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 30, para 28; 
Gough v DPP [2013] EWHC 3267; Giniewski v France (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 23; E.S. v Austria (App no. 
38450/12), judgment of 25 October 2018.  
128 Butt v SSHD [2017] EWHC 1930 [96]-[151]. 
129 See: Roj TV A/S v Denmark (App no. 40454/07) decision of 17 April 2018, para 47; Molnar v Romania (App 
no. 16637/06), decision of 23 October 2012, para 23 (concerning in part homophobic expression); Williamson v 
Germany (App no. 64496/17), judgment of 8 January 2019, paras 25-27. 
17 
 
PDG or DA in schools.130 The Article was relied on to effect such an exclusionary approach 
in Norwood v UK131 in relation to an expression of anti-Muslim sentiment;132 inadmissibility 
was found to arise, although the expression was unlikely to inspire violence;133  rather, it 
linked Muslims as a group with “a grave act of terrorism….” and was incompatible with 
Convention values, “notably, tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination”.134 A more 
readily defensible reliance on Article 17 arose in Belkacem v Belgium:135 an Article 10 claim 
from a Salafist preacher convicted of offences relating to incitement to violence against non-
Muslims was declared inadmissible; the Court, however, elided the application of Article 17 
to incitement to violence - “defending Sharia while calling for violence to establish it could 
be regarded as ‘hate speech’” – with a statement of much more general import: “each 
Contracting State was entitled to oppose political movements based on religious 
fundamentalism.”136 Interference under Prevent with speakers or literature in schools 
expressing similar ‘extremist’ viewpoints would tend to fall within Article 17, following this 
over-broad approach, especially if associated with groups opposed to ECHR values, such as 
the BNP in Norwood or Sharia4Belgium in Belkacem. A potential example is provided by 
school-boy Rahmaan Mohammadi who read out pro-Palestinian leaflets produced by the pro-
Hamas organization, Friends of al-Aqsa mosque, in the classroom, and was referred to police 
by the school,137 although no action was taken.138  
 
But this broad exclusionary approach is clearly open to criticism as failing to confine itself to 
expressions of support for violence, and as demonstrating a striking contrast to the Court's 
tendency to create a broad scope for Article 10(1), combined with the demand under Article 
10(2) for particularly weighty justification for interference with speech of political or moral 
import.139 Such a justification was, however, identified in respect of one form of ‘extremist’ 
speech in preference to relying on Article 17 in Vejdeland v Sweden;140 the applicants had 
distributed homophobic leaflets in a secondary school, resulting in their convictions for 
“agitation against a national or ethnic group”. The school setting, it was found, militated in 
                                                          
130 See e.g.: Garaudy v France (App no. 65831/01), decision of 24 June 2003 (French only). 
131 Norwood v UK (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. SE11. 
132 Ibid, para 111. 
133 Ibid, para 113-14. 
134 Ibid, para 114. 
135 Belkacem v Belgium (App no. 34367/14), decision of 20 July 2017. 
136 Ibid, pp.2-3.  
137 Rights Watch, fn.2, paras 99-115.  
138 Open Society Justice Initiative, fn.74, pp.86-89. 
139 Baka v Hungary (2017) 64 E.H.R.R. 6, para 159; see further Butt v SSHD [2017] EWHC 1930 [112].  
140 (2014) 58 E.H.R.R. 15. 
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favour of finding that the interference with their activities was justified, given the 
unacceptability of homophobic expression in a democratic society.141 A similar stance was 
adopted in Butt (hypothetically); it was initially claimed that the HEPDG was unlawful on the 
basis that it was not ‘prescribed by law’ under Article 10(2) since it was not drafted with 
sufficient precision, it contained discretionary powers of uncertain scope and it lacked 
safeguards against abuse of those powers.142 Those arguments, which reflect those of certain 
NGOs and academics,143 were rejected, primarily because they misconstrued the nature of the 
HEPDG’s status, since the Guidance must merely be “taken into account” by a relevant 
decision-maker.144  
 
The claim in Butt that the HEPDG was not a necessary measure in a democratic society since 
it was intended to prevent people being drawn into non-violent as well as violent ‘extremism’ 
was also rejected,145 in a significant judicial exposition of the links between terrorist violence 
and ‘extremism’: non-violent ‘extremism’, it was found, could be characterised as promoting 
“hatred and division...encouraging isolationism”,146 a sense of separateness, alienation, 
victimhood…at one with a rigid....version of religion or ideology” capable of justifying 
violence,147 since those persuaded by the expression might reject the democratic means of 
effecting legal change.148 Inclusion of such ‘extremism’ was therefore found to be rationally 
connected to the aim of protecting the rights of others to be free from threats of violence.149 
Those findings in respect of speech inconsistent with democratic values, including 
intolerance of non-state actors for other groups, would also apply in schools as regards 
satisfying the necessity test. Such an approach would also be consistent with that taken to 
non-discrimination under Article 14 and with the emphasis on the preservation of a 
                                                          
141 Ibid, paras 54-56. See also Ibragim Iragimov and ors v Russia (App nos. 1413/08, 28621/11), judgment of 28 
August 2018, paras 61-63: application of Article 17 was not accepted and a breach of Article 10 found since 
statements condemnatory of non-Muslims were put forward, but in a context of tolerance; see also Perincek v 
Switzerland (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 6, para 115. 
142 Butt v SSHD [2017] EWHC 1930 [96]. 
143 See Rights Watch, fn.2, para 18, and fn.74.  
144 Butt v SSHD [2017] EWHC 1930 [98]. 
145 Ibid [128], [140]. 
146 Ibid [127], [129].  
147 Ibid [134]-[137]. This description conforms to the stance of Islamic ‘extremist’ groups, such as Al-
Muhajiroun; see e.g. M. Kenney, The Islamic State in Britain (Cambridge: CUP, 2018), chap 3. See further 
fn.159. 
148 Ibid [138]. 




democratic society under Protocol 1, Article 2,150 while it is also bolstered by provisions of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child providing for the free expression of children, 
and for their self-development in education.151  
 
Proportionality demands under Article 10(2) would tend to be satisfied where the ‘extremist’ 
speech targeted had links to terrorism, and also since the consequences for pupils of 
interventions are normally fairly minimal; as discussed, most do not proceed past an initial 
enquiry,152 and if referral of a pupil for support occurs it is voluntary. The imposition of a 
prohibition order153 against a member of staff or a ban on a speaker found to express 
‘extremist’ views to pupils, would have a more significant impact, but, depending on the 
evidence as to the link with terrorism, the need to manage the risk of ‘radicalisation’ posed by 
such individuals would tend to be greater.154  
 
Such a full application of the tests under Article 10(2) to Prevent-based interference with 
non-violent ‘extremist’ expression, confining reliance on Article 17 to expressions of violent 
‘extremism,’155 would avoid setting “aside substantial principles and safeguards that are 
characteristic of the European speech-protective framework”,156 while also bringing greater 
methodological consistency to the policing of the divide between Articles 17 and 10. 
 
A reformed iteration of Prevent – redefining ‘extremism’ 
 
Although, as discussed, Prevent might survive another specific Article 10-based challenge, 
this time in the context of schools, revision of the Guidance is still required: its broadened 
scope in opposing ‘radicalisation’ and non-violent ‘extremism’ has not been accompanied by 
                                                          
150 See: Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 711, para 53; Campbell and 
Cosans v UK (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 293, para 58. 
151 Article 13 protects children’s freedom of expression, while under Article 29(1)(a) education should be aimed 
at the “development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential”, 
and the “preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, 
tolerance, equality of sexes” (Article 29(1)(d)). 
152 See fn.80. 
153 See fn.93. 
154 In a different context it has been found: “a college…is entitled to have rules restricting the nature of the 
language it is appropriate for teachers...to use towards students...this comes within...Article 10(2) ECHR…”: 
Wood v Oldham College [2004] EWCA Civ 1833 [28].  
155 As in e.g. Hizb ut Tahrir and Others v Germany (App no. 31098/08), decision of 12 June 2012, para 73 (a 
representative of the Islamic group had advocated the destruction of Israel and had written articles purporting to 
justify suicide attacks). 
156 H. Cannie and D. Voorhoof, “The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the ECHR: An Added Value 
for Democracy and Human Rights Protection?” (2011) 29(1) Netherlands Law Quarterly 54, p.83.  
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a PDG statement delineating more clearly both the nature of the ideologies associated with 
terrorism that the strategy opposes, and the need to identify the link to terrorism. Prevent 
therefore continues to rely on imprecise concepts of fundamental ‘British’ values, 
‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’, without clearly tracing the links between them, meaning 
that the scheme is doubly imprecise, due both to the lack of certainty as to the demands 
placed on schools and the wording of s26.157 This lack of clarity has contributed to occasional 
disproportionate actions by schools, fuelling the widespread criticism of Prevent to the effect 
that it chills school-based expression.  
 
But the focus of the critical debate should also encompass the impact that certain forms of 
‘extremism’ have in chilling the expression of the groups deemed ‘inferior’, as appears in 
what may be termed ‘supremacist’ ideology. The term ‘supremacist’ as used here refers to 
ideas associated with white supremacism – a movement that seeks to seize power for its 
cultural/religiously or racially (self)-defined ‘group’ on the basis of its perceived intrinsic 
superiority to other such ‘groups’; the term covers isolationist/separatist supremacist groups 
seeking to seize power to isolate themselves from other groups.158 While the term is 
commonly associated with white supremacism, and is used in that sense here, it can also be 
applied to certain Islamic movements: for example, the ideologies of Al-Nusra Front, ISIS or 
Al Qaeda amount to forms of Muslim supremacism, due to the interpretations placed upon 
concepts of loyalty and enmity/disavowal and offensive Jihad,159 which amount to a belief 
that Muslims must seize power on a basis resembling that of white supremacist ideology.160 
Examples of ‘supremacism’ would include the view taken of non-Muslims and Ahmadi, Shia 
or Sufi Muslims by Sunni Muslim supremacist groups,161 or of Muslims generally by 
white/European supremacist groups.162  
 
Expressions of supremacism in schools are already combated to an extent under Prevent: the 
PDG and DA make it clear that the duty is not designed to override existing duties inviting 
                                                          
157 See C. Walker, fn.19, 732-36. 
158 See further L. Bowman-Grieve “Exploring ‘Stormfront’: A Virtual Community of the Radical Right” (2009) 
32(11) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 989.  
159 M. Kenney, The Islamic State in Britain (fn.147), p.131; G. Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (LB 
Tauris & co., 2002) pp. 219-222; Shakeel Begg v BBC [2016] EWHC 2688 [107],[115],[119]-[130],[370]. 
160 See: K. Chaudhry, “Like white supremacy, another monster rears its head in America, and no one is talking 
about it”, Huffington Post, 26.11.17, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/like-white-supremacy-another-monster-
rears-its-head_b_5a174fa6e4b0250a107bfe94 [Accessed 01.04.20].  
161 See: Commission for Countering Extremism, fn.41, p.110; D. Gartenstein-Ross, ‘The role of consensus in the 
contemporary struggle for Islam’ (2008) 6(4) The Review of faith & International Affairs 13, 14-16. 
162 See S. Khan and T. McMahon, The Battle for British Islam (London: Saqi 2016), chap 2.  
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pluralism of debate,163 and the DA indicates that pressure should be brought to bear against 
governors, teachers and pupils who espouse and express such intolerant views, contrary to 
promoting ‘mutual respect’ between groups,164 a pressure it is hard to describe as illegitimate 
in free speech terms.165 Various sources, including local authority166 and teaching union 
guidance,167 have emphasised that promotion of ‘British’ values opposes the singling out of 
certain groups as either inferior or superior, or as more or less entitled to enjoy freedoms and 
benefits than others, while schemes to support schools to promote such values have been 
found to improve teaching on pluralism and tolerance.168 ECHR values opposing supremacist 
expression, reflected in particular under Articles 10 and 14, Protocol 1 Article 2169 – 
supporting plurality of debate, democratic participation, the search for truth, self-
development,170 non-discrimination – may thus be said to find some, albeit inadequate, 
reflection in the current iteration of the Prevent strategy.    
 
The current independent Review therefore provides the twin opportunities, first for creating 
more precisely focused curbs on certain forms of school-based supremacist speech in a 
revised PDG and DA. Secondly, such revision should reject an over-broad notion of 
‘extremism’, as starkly illustrated by the much criticised recent (albeit, temporary) inclusion 
of Extinction Rebellion in Prevent documents.171 The current all-encompassing definition of 
‘extremism’, impliedly linking the notion to all forms of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘terrorism’, is a 
                                                          
163 PDG, fn.22, paras 58,64, DA, fn.11, p.8.  
164 DA, fn.11, p.8. 
165 See Greer and Bell, “Counter-terrorist law in British universities: a review of the ‘prevent’ debate” [2018] 
P.L. 84, 97-99. 
166 See, e.g. “Understanding Tower Hamlets’ Prevent Guidance for Schools” 
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167 National Union of Teachers, “Education and Extremism: Advice for Members” (2015) 
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170 See further as to these speech rationales: F. Schauer, ‘Free Speech in a World of Private Power’, T. 
Campbell, ‘Rationales for Freedom of Communication’ and E. Barendt, ‘Importing United States Free Speech 
Jurisprudence?’ in T. Campbell and W. Sadurski (eds.), Freedom of Communication (Aldershot: Dartmouth 
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key failing of the policy,172 since the term does not clearly identify the groups and ideas 
which must be opposed; thus it is readily misrepresented as targeting broader groups, such as 
Muslims. But this conceptual weakness, inherent in counter-‘extremism’ policy, need not 
mean that CTSA Part 5 underpinning guidance linking counter-extremism with counter-
terrorism should simply be repealed.173  
 
Rather, in order to seize these opportunities, the interpretation placed upon ‘extremism’ by 
the High Court in Butt,174 which also demanded a link to terrorism, could provide a 
foundation for clarifying the PDG and DA to refer to “supremacist extremism,” since groups 
with supremacist goals necessarily oppose anti-discrimination efforts inherent in the securing 
of human rights in democratic societies. So use of the term would cohere with the support of 
the ECHR expressed in Articles 10(2), 14 and 17 for the rights and freedoms enjoyed in such 
societies; in particular, Article 10 read with 14 would oppose a strong appeal to freedom of 
religious expression to justify supremacist failures of tolerance in relation to other groups.175 
The Commission for Countering Extremism, in a significant Report, found that such 
supremacist beliefs (and expressions of hatred/hostility to other groups) should form a core 
element of the definition of ‘extremism’,176 although the replacement term recommended in 
the Report, ‘hateful extremism,’ does not, it is argued, depart sufficiently from the current 
overbroad definition. It would also be essential to state in the PDG that supremacist 
‘extremism’ denotes opposition to ‘fundamental British human rights values’: since such 
values are universal, Prevent would be less susceptible to criticism due to its perceived 
opposition to ‘non-British’ cultural values.177 Further, clearly, some supremacist groups are 
unlinked to terrorism in the UK and are not the target of Prevent; therefore the PDG would 
also need to specify the need for a potential linkage between the “supremacist extremism,” in 




                                                          
172 See Commission for Countering Extremism, fn.41, p.94. 
173 Repeal of all such legislation was recently recommended by the Special Rapporteur: fn.5. 
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Revising the PDG to target “supremacist extremism,” if potentially linked to terrorism, 
relying on the exposition as to such linkage in Butt, would cohere with Prevent’s aspiration to 
be compatible with free speech values, furthering its goal more transparently of supporting 
the expression of a plurality of views in schools, as opposed to a supremacist promotion of 
pupils’ isolation from such plurality. Prevent would then not only be rendered more clearly 
compatible with free expression values, but would also have a stronger claim to support 
equality of expression by members of minority groups, such as Muslims, as against both 
white/European supremacists who reject their values as ‘non-British’, and against Muslim 
supremacists who claim that values of political, religious and sexual tolerance are ‘British’, 
and so irreconcilable with ‘Muslim’ values.178 Clearer alignment of a new iteration of Prevent 
with human rights values, and with an anti-supremacist approach clearly linked to countering 
terrorism, would tend to curb persistent narratives to the effect that Prevent chills school-
based free expression. 
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